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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO GENDERRESTRICTIVE SCHOOL DRESS CODES
IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
By: Patrick Eoghan Murray1

This Article examines three potential
constitutional challenges to a school dress code that
mandates traditional gender norms. The analysis focuses
on the Ninth Circuit to illustrate the various hurdles
potential student litigants face from case law that is
not explicitly overruled. It is likely that despite these
challenges, a student litigant will be able to successfully
advance a constitutional claim against such a dress code
in the Ninth Circuit.
I.

Introduction

On February 9, 2012, the School Board in
Suffolk, Virginia proposed a dress code provision
(DCP) that prohibited any “clothing worn by a
student that is not in keeping with a student’s gender
and causes a disruption and/or distracts others from
the educational process or poses a health or safety
concern.”2
Although no court ruled on the
constitutionality of this particular dress code, 3 its
proposal raised the question: What options do
student litigants have if they are prevented from
wearing clothing that allows them to expresses
gender non-conformity? This Article analyzes
potential constitutional claims that a student could
bring against an identical provision and ultimately
concludes that the Ninth Circuit would find it to be
unconstitutional.4
By limiting the analysis to the Ninth Circuit,
this Article illustrates the various hurdles left behind
from older precedent that conflict with more recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
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II. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Challenge
The DCP expressly identifies gender as a basis
for school administrators to regulate student dress. Its
discriminatory nature is evident in the requirement
that students conform to gender stereotypes: Girls
cannot dress like boys, and boys cannot dress like
girls. As such, the DCP arguably violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The validity of the DCP would largely
turn on whether intermediate scrutiny or rational
basis review is applied. A law that makes genderbased classifications must survive intermediate
scrutiny in order to be constitutional.5 Under
intermediate scrutiny, a gender-based classification
is unconstitutional unless it “serve[s] important
governmental objectives and . . . [is] substantially
related to achievement of those objectives.”6 This is a
difficult standard to meet because the justification for
the classification must be “exceedingly persuasive” to
survive constitutional review.7
However, when a law does not make genderbased classifications and is instead gender neutral on
its face, the plaintiff must prove both a discriminatory
purpose behind the law as well as a discriminatory
impact in order to trigger intermediate scrutiny.8
Absent proof of discriminatory intent, a genderneutral law will be subjected to rational basis review,
the most lenient standard of constitutional review. If a
court deems the DCP to be gender neutral and hence
subject to rational basis review, it will be extremely
difficult to establish an equal protection violation.9
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In the Ninth Circuit a prospective plaintiff
would have to overcome the obstacle of contrary
Circuit precedent. Simply put, the Ninth Circuit
has held that student dress codes that are gender
explicit are nevertheless constitutional. The leading
case is King v. Saddleback Junior College District ,10
which involved an equal protection challenge to a
public school dress code requirement that “[a] boy’s
hair shall not fall below the eyes in front and shall
not cover the ears, and it shall not extend below the
collar in back.”11 Under the code, “[g]irls could have
long hair and boys could not.”12 The Ninth Circuit
in King rejected the equal protection claim, however,
stating that neither the “difference in treatment [n]or
classification . . . creat[ed] a substantial constitutional
question.”13
However, King is at odds with four decades
worth of subsequent Supreme Court precedent that
has cast substantial constitutional doubt on genderbased classifications that rest on assumptions about
how females and males should look, act, or conduct
themselves.14 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has not
relied on King since the mid 1970s. Given these
developments, it is unlikely that the Ninth Circuit
would continue to adhere to King today, and instead,
would apply intermediate scrutiny to the DCP.15
Under intermediate scrutiny, the analysis
begins with the asserted government objective. The
Supreme Court has warned parties who try to prove
a substantial relationship between gender-based
and an important governmental interest that “[t]he
justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or
invented post hoc in response to litigation.”16 Here,
the language of the DCP recites the interest: in
protecting the health and safety of students in the
school environment and in providing an effective
learning environment free of disruptions and
distractions. These were the same reasons the Suffolk
School Board specified at the time it considered this
type of dress code provision.17 Maintaining the health
and safety of public school students is unquestionably
an important governmental interest.18
However, to merely state that the DCP’s
purpose is to protect students and promote a positive
learning environment does not end the inquiry.19
If the DCP rests on “fixed notions concerning the
roles and abilities of males and females [that] reflects
archaic and stereotypic notions,” then its purpose is
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not legitimate.20 Put another way, if the assumption
of the DCP is that school order and the students’
learning environment will be impaired if boys dress
like girls and girls dress like boys, then the basis for
the DCP may be constitutionally suspect. That said, a
court is likely to accept as important a public school’s
asserted interest in promoting order and a stable
learning environment and not declare that purpose
invalid even though it may rest on stereotypes that
would not be acceptable outside the public school
setting.21
The DCP may be more constitutionally
vulnerable at the second step of the analysis—
whether it is substantially related to the interest in
school safety and a positive learning environment. In
determining whether a gender-based classification is
substantially related to the important goals, a court
will scrutinize the classification to determine if it is
necessary to achieve those goals.22
In King, where a male student challenged
the constitutionality of a hair-length requirement for
men, the Ninth Circuit was persuaded by the opinions
of teachers and school administrators who believed
that the school dress code prevented behavior that
“interfere[d] with the educational process.”.23 Eleven
teachers and administrators submitted affidavits to
support this position.24 The Ninth Circuit found that
“none of the affidavits is so inherently improbable
that it is lacking in value as evidence.”25
A proponent of the DCP, by contrast, would
be unlikely to find similar support among school
administrators to legitimize the regulation. At least in
Suffolk, there seemed to be scant evidence of either
danger to students or distraction in the classroom,
and the School Board member who proposed
the provision cited only vague and anonymous
complaints.26 The principals of the schools in the
Suffolk City Public Schools stated that “they hadn’t
seen [teen boys wearing wigs, dresses, and makeup to class],” and the superintendent had received
no complaints and had seen only one instance of a
gender-nonconforming student.27 Even the school
board member who initially proposed the restriction
on gender-nonconforming clothes admitted she had
not received any complaints during the school year
before the dress code provision was proposed.28
Furthermore, the argument that the DCP
is substantially related to preventing distractions in
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school is weak because of its over- and underinclusive
nature.29 The DCP is over-inclusive because it likely
implicates more students than just those who would
be distracting or who would be the target of bullying.30
The DCP is underinclusive because it ignores other
forms of clothing that conforms to gender stereotypes
but is nonetheless distracting and dangerous or could
make students the targets of bullies.
A gender-neutral dress code provision
addressing distracting clothing seems much better
suited to fulfilling the important governmental
interests of maintaining student safety and an
effective learning environment. Under such a
provision, teachers would have the ability to restrict
all distracting and provocative clothing and would not
have to single out gender-nonconforming students.
This is ultimately the type of dress code provision
that the Suffolk School Board adopted when faced
with the prospect of litigation.31
In short, the DCP is both over- and
underinclusive with respect to the stated goals of
ensuring safety and preventing distractions, and thus
it is likely to be found unconstitutional at the second
step of intermediate scrutiny review.
III. First Amendment Challenge

A. Clothing Choice Can Constitute Expression for
Purposes of the First Amendment
If a student is sanctioned under the DCP for
wearing clothing that contains writing or a symbol—
for example, a shirt with the inscription “I am a girl”
or a gender symbol—the expression on the clothing
will likely be considered pure speech, and the student
will have a cognizable First Amendment challenge
to the DCP. 32 That type of pure speech, however, is
probably not what the DCP’s drafters had in mind,
and a school administrator may not even find it
distracting enough to require removal.
The First Amendment protects not only
verbal speech but also nonverbal speech, which the
Supreme Court describes as “expressive conduct.”33
Because an “apparently limitless variety of conduct
can be labeled speech,” however, the Supreme Court
has held that only conduct that is “sufficiently imbued
with elements of communication” will be protected
by the First Amendment.34
20

While the First Amendment’s protection
of expressive conduct does not require that the
particularized message be “succinctly articulable,”35
the actor must have “[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message . . . and in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood [must be] great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed
it.”36
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on
whether clothing choice implicates student speech.
While some circuits have considered choice of
clothing to potentially constitute expressive conduct,
others have not.37
The Ninth Circuit has also not yet ruled
on whether a student’s choice of clothing can be
expressive conduct that triggers a First Amendment
analysis. In Jacobs v. Clark County School District,
the Ninth Circuit addressed several challenges
to a public school district’s uniform policy that
mandated “solid khaki colored bottoms and solidcolored polo, tee, or button-down shirts (blue, red
or white) with or without [the school’s] logos.”38
The Ninth Circuit did not decide whether a student
challenger’s refusal to wear the required uniform as a
symbol of his opposition to conformity constituted
expressive conduct.39 However, it presumed for the
purpose of its analysis that the student had stated a
First Amendment claim for “deprivation of . . . First
Amendment rights to engage in expressive conduct via
. . . choice of clothing and to be free from compelled
speech”40
In the case of the DCP, students may be able
to demonstrate that their gender-nonconforming
clothes constitute expressive conduct if they can
demonstrate both an intent to convey a particularized
message and a great likelihood that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it. The students’
ability to do so would depend on the context in
which the clothing was worn. If a student states that
he or she did not have a purpose for wearing a certain
kind of clothing, the First Amendment would not be
implicated. However, if the student states that he or
she sought to communicate a message via clothing, he
or she would have a much better chance of sustaining
a First Amendment claim.41
The Supreme Court has long held that
students in public schools do not “shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”42 “They cannot
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be punished merely for expressing their personal views
on the school premises . . . unless school authorities
have reason to believe that such expression will
‘substantially interfere with the work of the school or
impinge upon the rights of other students.’”43
In Tinker v. Des Moines, a group of students
organized a silent protest of the United States’
involvement in the Vietnam War by wearing black
armbands with a peace symbol.44 In anticipation of the
protest, and in fear that it would cause a disturbance,
the Des Moines Independent School District changed
school policy to forbid students from wearing such
armbands.45 After they were suspended for wearing
their armbands, the students sued for violation of their
right to free speech under the First Amendment.46 In
finding in favor of the students, the Supreme Court
concluded that “[i]n order for the State in the person
of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular
expression of opinion, it must be able to show that
its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”47
The Ninth Circuit has used Tinker as a
guide in its analysis for all student-speech cases for
expression that is not “vulgar, lewd, obscene, and
plainly offensive speech . . . [or] school-sponsored
speech.”48 However, the Ninth Circuit has limited
the application of the heightened form of scrutiny
articulated in Tinker to regulations that restrict a
particular viewpoint or particular content.49 In Jacobs,
the court distinguished the uniform policy at issue
there from the armband restriction in Tinker.50 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that while Tinker involved a
restriction on viewpoint warranting a higher level of
scrutiny, the uniform policy in Jacobs was viewpointand content-neutral and thus deserved intermediate
scrutiny.51 The court made this determination by
examining both the purpose of the dress code and
by considering how the uniform policy would work
in practice.52 The court found both the text-based
viewpoint-neutral purpose of the uniform policy
and the viewpoint-neutral reasons the school board
considered when it adopted the uniform policy to be
reasons in favor of applying intermediate scrutiny.53
Both the text of the rule in Jacobs and the records of
the proceedings leading to its adoption emphasized
the educational value of the rule rather than any effort
to limit a particular viewpoint. The court considered
claims that the policy restricted a particular viewpoint
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in practice, but ultimately ruled that “allowing
students’ otherwise solid-colored clothing to contain
a school logo-an item expressing little, if any, genuine
communicative message-does not convert a contentneutral school uniform policy into a content-based
one.”54
The DCP is likely to be found viewpoint
and content-neutral because of its stated purpose.
Just as in Jacobs, in which the stated purpose was to
further an educational goal, the DCP states that the
gender nonconforming clothing should be restricted
to prevent “a disruption and/or [a distraction for]
others from the educational process or poses a health
or safety concern.”55 Additionally, if the adoption of
the DCP in a Ninth Circuit school district resembles
the proceedings in the Suffolk Virginia School Board,
there will be evidence that the purpose was to prevent
bullying and distractions, not the expression of gender
non-conformity. Such a record would then be similar
to the record in Jacobs, in which the court noted a
desire to prevent distractions and reduce tensions
between students.
An argument could be made that the DCP is
viewpoint-restrictive because it favors one viewpoint
over another: Gender-conforming viewpoints are
protected, while gender-nonconforming viewpoints
are restricted. However, even if students convincingly
argue that gender non-conformity is a particular
viewpoint, the restriction is minimal; students are
only restricted from wearing clothes in school, and
have the ability to express themselves outside of
school. Additionally, the DCP does not prevent
all opportunities to wear gender-nonconforming
clothes—only gender-nonconforming clothes that
cause distractions or danger to students.
B. It is Likely That the DCP Would Withstand
First Amendment Intermediate Scrutiny
The Ninth Circuit has articulated a threepart test for whether a school dress code passes
intermediate scrutiny. The provision will be sustained
if “(1) ‘it furthers an important or substantial
government interest’; (2) ‘the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression’;
and (3) ‘the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest.’’’56
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1. The Ninth Circuit Would Likely Find
That the DCP Furthers an Important
Governmental Interest
In order to prove that the DCP furthers
an important governmental interest, the proponent
of the DCP must first prove that its “‘stated goals
qualify as important or substantial’” and that “the
government’s evidence ‘demonstrate[s] that the
recited harms are real, not merely conjectural and
that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms
in a direct and material way.’”57 In Jacobs, the Ninth
Circuit held that “the interest in fostering conducive
learning environments for our nation’s children” was
unquestionably an important interest.58 The school
district in Jacobs was able to show that the uniform
code furthered these goals by providing affidavits
from the school administrators stating that the policy
was working, and one report from the Department
of Education acknowledging the benefits of school
uniforms.59 The Ninth Circuit was also persuaded by
the plaintiff ’s failure to produce any evidence that the
policy had been a failure.60
In order to satisfy this prong of the analysis,
the proponent of the DCP would not need to show
any empirical evidence that the DCP had been
effective in preventing disruptions, distractions, or
health and safety concerns. All that would be needed
is affidavits from the teachers demonstrating that the
DCP had been effective, and evidence that students
had been singled out by bullies for wearing gendernonconforming clothing. The Suffolk School Board
would have had difficulty satisfying this prong, since
the only reports of distractions or bullying had been
anonymous, but this could easily have been remedied
had the teachers come forward before a case went to
trial. 61
2. The Ninth Circuit Would Likely Find the
DCP Unrelated to the Suppression of Free
Expression
The proponent of the DCP must prove
that the DCP is “‘unrelated to the suppression of
free expression,’”62 In holding that this standard was
satisfied in Jacobs, the Ninth Circuit determined
that the stated purpose of the law was not aimed at
preventing students from expressing their views on
particular subjects.63 The court also found persuasive
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the absence of “evidence suggesting that the District’s
stated goals were mere pretexts for its true purpose
of preventing students from expressing their views on
particular subjects.”64
Since the stated goals of the DCP are to
prevent disruptions, distractions, and to protect the
health and safety of students, assuming no evidence
of pretext emerges in a particular case, it is unlikely
that the proponent of the DCP will have difficulty in
satisfying this element.
3. The Ninth Circuit Would Likely Find
Any Incidental Restrictions Imposed on
Students’ First Amendment Freedoms
Are No Greater Than is Essential to the
Furtherance of the Goals of the DCP
The proponent of the DCP must prove that
its restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are
no greater than necessary by demonstrating that the
regulation “‘leave[s] open ample alternative channels’
for student communication.”65 In Jacobs, the
uniform policy was found to be narrowly tailored to
achieve the school district’s objective because it only
“limit[ed] students’ abilities to express themselves via
their clothing choices,” and allowed students to “have
verbal conversations with other students, publish
articles in school newspapers, and join student
clubs.”66 Also, the court in Jacobs was persuaded
that even the choices in clothing was not “completely
curtailed,” since students could still wear what they
pleased “after school, on weekends, and at non-school
functions.”67 While the court stated that the uniform
policy satisfied this prong because its limitation was
“during the narrowest possible window consistent
with the District’s goals of creating a productive,
distraction-free educational environment for its
students,” the court did not consider any other less
restrictive alternatives (more relaxed uniform policies)
that could have achieved the same goal.68
Under Jacobs, the Ninth Circuit would likely
hold the DCP to be narrowly tailored. To be sure,
clothing choice may sometimes be the only way a
student can express his or her gender identity. 69 On
the other hand, the DCP is limited in its scope: It
applies only when students are in school, and even
then, only when the clothes are disruptive, distracting,
or dangerous. Students would still have the ability
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to express their gender-nonconforming views in
conversations with other students and to publish
articles in school newspapers. They would also have
the ability to wear gender-nonconforming clothing
outside of school hours.
IV. Vagueness Challenge
The DCP is vulnerable to a “void-forvagueness” challenge. This is because the DCP
arguably does not give students adequate notice
about the type of clothing that is banned, and because
the term “gender” leaves room for discriminatory
enforcement. However, courts generally have taken
a deferential stance when it comes to public school
regulations of students and accordingly rejected voidfor-vagueness challenges. That line of precedent
will be difficult to overcome for plaintiffs seeking to
challenge the DCP.
A law can be found to be vague for “two
independent reasons.”70 First, the doctrine of vagueness
“incorporates notions of fair notice or warning,”71 and
a regulation violates due process of law by failing to
provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct.72 In
short, a regulation is void for vagueness if it “forbids
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
[persons] of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”73
Second, the void-for-vagueness doctrine prohibits
rules that permit “arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.”74 “A vague law impermissibly delegates
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis . .
. .”75 “[P]erhaps the most meaningful aspect of the
vagueness doctrine is . . . the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement.”76
A. The DCP’s Use of the Term “Gender” is
Arguably Vague
The DCP’s use of the term “gender” raises
two possible vagueness problems. The first is how the
students’ gender should be defined. The second is
how school officials (including teachers) or students
would determine what clothes are “in keeping with a
student’s gender.”
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1. How Should a Student’s “Gender” Be
Defined?
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines
“gender” as applied to people in two ways: “a) sex
and b) the behavioral, cultural, or psychological traits
typically associated with one sex.”77
“Sex” is the more straightforward of the
two definitions, but still leaves plenty of room for
interpretation (and confusion). Sex refers to “either
of the two major forms of individuals that occur in
many species and that are distinguished respectively
as female or male especially on the basis of their
reproductive organs and structures.”78 The distinction
can be drawn in different ways: the structure and
function of an individual’s genitalia, the production
of various hormones in an individual, or the structure
of the chromosomes found within each cell of the
individual’s body (XY chromosomes for males and
XX for females).79 Even these biological distinctions
do not necessarily lead to a binary division. About
1.7 percent of the population is born “intersex”—a
condition in which an individual is born with the
physical characteristics of both sexes—and defies
categorization into either group.80 Courts have not
agreed on what physical traits should be determinative
of an individual’s sex.81
The second definition of gender is nebulous.
It describes gender as a combination of how society
defines an individual and how the individual defines
him or herself.82 In western society, gender has
evolved to be considered a binary concept—so that
it is associated with the two main sexes.83 However,
what society views as “masculine” or “feminine” varies
dramatically across generations, has changed over
time, and continues to change.84 Also, individuals
may be transgender and have a different gender
identity from either their biological sex or societal
expectations.85
By failing to define how school officials should
determine a student’s gender, the DCP provides
inadequate notice of what clothing is permissible to
intersex students or transgender students. Intersex
students will not fall neatly into either of the
categories of male or female, and transgender students
may adopt a different gender identity from the label
that society places on them. The language of the
DCP does not provide guidance for these students.
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Additionally, because the statute does not provide a
definition of gender, teachers have vast discretion to
apply their own conception of gender to students.
This opens the door to discrimination against intersex
and transgender students by teachers.86
2. What is Clothing That is “In Keeping
With a Student’s Gender”?
If defining a student’s gender is difficult,
determining what clothing is “in keeping with a
student’s gender” is even more difficult. Clothing is
inanimate and does not have biological indicators to
guide how it should be categorized, so the gender of
an article of clothing is entirely based upon societal
and cultural views.87 These views have changed over
time and continue to change. 88 Androgynous fashion
is moving from the cutting edge of the fashion world
to the global mainstream.89 Many students have
adopted gender-nonconforming clothing in their
personal style and have different views from their
teachers as to what clothing is in keeping with their
gender.90
By failing to define what clothing is “in
keeping with a student’s gender,” the DCP arguably
provides inadequate notice to students making
clothing choices. Depending on how regressive a
school official’s views on fashion are, the official
could conceivably enforce the DCP against any girl
who, for example, wears pants, a baseball cap, or a
short hairstyle. Similarly, an official could conceivably
enforce the DCP against any boy who wears the color
pink, has long hair, or wears earrings.
B. A Certain Level of Vagueness is Permitted in
the Public School Context
These potential vagueness problems with
the DCP are probably insufficient to overcome
the deference that courts typically afford public
school administrators. Simply put, in the public
school context, the vagueness doctrine is relaxed
significantly. In particular, courts give teachers and
school administrators flexibility to protect the safety
of students and maintain order within schools, which
is, of course, the premise of the DCP.
In Bethel v. Fraser, for example, the student
plaintiff was suspended for giving an innuendo-laden
speech to a school assembly.91 The student argued that
the suspension was a violation of due process.92 The
24

student claimed that because the school disciplinary
rule proscribing “obscene” language did not provide
adequate notice, “he had no way of knowing that
the delivery of the speech in question would subject
him to disciplinary sanctions.”93 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, emphasizing the need for
deference to public school administrators in their
efforts to provide for a safe learning environment. The
Court stated: “We have recognized that ‘maintaining
security and order in the schools requires a certain
degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures,
and we have respected the value of preserving the
informality of the student-teacher relationship.’”94
The Ninth Circuit has not addressed a
void for vagueness challenge to a school dress code
provision. However, in Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified
School District, a district court in the Ninth Circuit
rejected a challenge to a school dress code provision
on vagueness grounds.95 The provision at issue in
that case allowed school officials to prohibit apparel
that would cause a disruption to school activities.96
The court emphasized the same goals of maintaining
order in school that were articulated in Fraser, and
concluded that the dress code at issue provided just
as much guidance as the school regulation in Fraser.97
The court added that the “[p]laintiffs d[id] not cite
to a single instance, in this circuit or any other, of
a school dress code’s ban on disruptive conduct or
apparel being held overly vague, and the Court is
aware of none.”98
By contrast, in Stephenson v. Davenport
Community School District, the Eighth Circuit struck
down on vagueness grounds a school disciplinary
provision that stated that “gang related activities such
as display of ‘colors,’ symbols, signals, signs, etc.,
will not be tolerated on school grounds” without
providing a definition of the term “gang.”99 The
Eighth Circuit counterbalanced the need in Fraser
to provide flexibility with the fact that the school
provision infringed upon First Amendment rights.100
The court held that the disciplinary provision was
facially void for vagueness for failing to define “gang,”
the “pivotal term.”101 The court based this reasoning
on the fact that failing to define the term “gang” would
not place students on notice of what type of behavior
was prohibited, and on the fact that the provision
“allow[ed] school administrators and local police
unfettered discretion to decide what represents a
gang symbol.”102 The court suggested that the schools
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should provide describe specifically the “gang related
activities it wishes to avoid” because “[g]ang symbols
. . . take many forms and are constantly changing,”
or otherwise those who enforce the provision will not
have “meaningful guidance.”103
It is difficult to determine which of these
approaches the Ninth Circuit would adopt if it were
faced with a vagueness challenge to the DCP. On
the one hand, the DCP is similar to the provision in
Stephenson because it is premised on a pivotal term—
gender—which directs the school administrator’s
enforcement without providing a definition. Like
the term “gang,” “gender” is a term that is constantly
changing and is open to a wide range of interpretations.
It also leaves teachers with nearly all of the discretion
as to how the term DCP would be enforced.
On the other hand, the DCP has a caveat
directing teachers to enforce this provision only
for gender non-conforming clothes that “[cause] a
disruption and/or distracts others from the educational
process or poses a health or safety concern.”104 This
provides a limitation on the vague term of “gender”
that did not exist in Stephenson, and seems to bring it
closer to the restriction at issue in Dariano. Thus, the
DCP probably would not be invalidated on vagueness
grounds.
V. Conclusion
A gender-nonconforming student litigant
in the Ninth Circuit will be faced with numerous
obstacles in trying to prove that a gender-restrictive
dress code provision is unconstitutional. However,
given the existence of three plausible constitutional
challenges, it is highly likely that a dress code provision
similar to that recently enacted by the Suffolk Virginia
School Board would be found to be unconstitutional.
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